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I.  Introduction 
This paper explores the process of the “Europeanization” of national Private Law 
regimes in the European Union from its antecedents in the internal market 
programme to the current proposals surrounding the (Draft) Common Frame of 
Reference ((D)CFR) and a Common European Sales Law. The paper begins by 
critically evaluating the rationale behind the consolidation/codification initiative, 
the evolution of the initiative and then drills into the broader implications of this 
process; considering, in particular, the Private International Law dimensions to the 
proposed (optional) Common European Sales Law (CESL). In this analysis we 
therefore enter a polycentric legal environment traversing Contract Law, Consumer 




II. Consolidation of Europeanised Private Law: 
Questioning the Rationale 
A.  Coherence in EU Private Law (1): Europeanization and Interlegality 
The intervention of EU secondary law in Member States’ Private Law systems has 
led to the increasing “Europeanization” of Private Law and the emergence of a new 
body of “EU Private Law” (Gemeinschaftsprivatrecht).1 This new body of law has 
proved unstable: sector-specific, “vertical” EU legislation combining with diver-
gent national transpositions and judicial interpretations. Yet precisely this insta-
bility has strengthened the case for further consolidation of EU private law; to the 
distilling of a single, coherent ius commune.2 Yet whilst few would question the 
constant need to improve legislation, or for greater transparency in national trans-
position practice, or for enhanced judicial collaboration, the elaboration of an EU 
Civil Code would be much more controversial, going beyond the enumerated 
powers of the EU.3 
                                                          
1 R. BROWNSWORD/ H-W. MICKLITZ/ L. NIGLIA/ S. WEATHERILL (eds), The 
Foundations of European Private Law, Oxford 2012; P.-C. MÜLLER-GRAFF (ed.), 
Gemeinsames Privatrecht in der Europäischen Gemeinschaft, Baden-Baden 1999; B. 
HEIDERHOFF, Gemeinschaftsprivatrecht, München 2005. See “Common Core of European 
Private law” Series, (M. BUSSANI/ U. MATTEI, et al. (eds)), Cambridge University Press: 
<www.cambridge.org>). Similarly Ius Commune Casebooks, (Hart Publishing: 
<www.hartpub.co.uk>).  
2 C. VON BAR, From Principles to Codification: Prospects for European Private Law, 
[2002] 8 Colum. J. Eur. L. 379; O. LANDO, Does the European Union need a Civil Code, 
[2003] RIW 1. 
3 S. WEATHERILL, Why Object to the Harmonisation of Private Law by the EC, 
(2004) 12 E.R.P.L. 636. 
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That national systems of Private Law would be influenced by European law 
was always clear given the goal of market integration central to the European 
Project. Indeed, the EU has always instrumentalised private (in particular contract) 
law as a simple means to complex policy ends: to achieve goals in competition, 
free movement, consumer protection, public procurement and non-discrimination. 
The law which emerged from this process is a functional rather than systematic 
body of law; developed piecemeal to solve problems, rather than holistically to 
ensure coherence.4 Indeed, initially, it was hoped that EC Law would simply erode 
market-partitioning national laws through application of the four freedoms, a 
competition of legal orders and a judicially initiated programme of negative 
integration.5 Set to this diverse background the case for greater coherence in EU 
Private Law appears vital. 
The Europeanization of national Private Law can be linked to Weiler’s 
model of the Transformation of Europe,6 a process beginning in earnest in the 
1980s with the advent of the Internal Market.7 Directly in Consumer Protection and 
Company law and indirectly, through block exemptions in competition law8 and in 
the EU policy fields,9 national Private Law was increasingly shaped by EU Law. 
Yet outside the fields of EU competence, national laws continued to apply, and 
national demarcations within the law, for example, between Contract and Tort, 
Contract and Property, held their divergent validities. The Europeanization of 
Private Law is therefore an aspect of what de Sousa Santos termed interlegality, of 
an intersection of legal orders.10 
 
 
B.  Coherence in EU Private Law (2): Fragmentation and Polycentricity 
Yet even where EU secondary law was passed “uniform” legal solutions were rare 
such that legal fragmentation has always accompanied EU harmonisation. Thus, 
whilst regulations frequently failed to unify the law due to bartering in the law-
making process, directives regularly established transposition frameworks, which 
                                                          
4 N. REICH, A Common Frame of Reference (CFR)-Ghost or Host for Integration?, 
(2006) 24 Wis. Int'l Law J. 425. 
5 W. SAUTER, The Economic Constitution of the EU, [1998] 4 Colum. J. Eur. L. 27; 
D.J. GERBER, Constitutionalizing the Economy: German Neo-liberalism, Competition law 
and the “New” Europe, [1994] 42 Am. J. Comp. L. 25; N. REICH, Europe's Economic Consti-
tution, or: A New Look at Keck, [1999] O.J.L.S. 337. 
6 J.H.H. WEILER, The Transformation of Europe, (1991) 100 Yale L. J. 2403. 
7 Single European Act, [1987] OJ L 169/1; UK: European Communities (Amend-
ment) Act 1986. 
8 Inter alia Commission Regulation 330/2010 on the application of Article 101(3) 
TFEU to categories of vertical agreements and concerted practices, [2010] OJ L 102/1. 
9 EU Policy fields: Public Health: Art. 168 TFEU; Environment: Arts. 191-193 
TFEU; Employment: Title IX TFEU; Industrial Policy: Art.173 TFEC; Economic and Social 
Cohesion: Title XVIII TFEU; R&D: Title XIX TFEU. G. BRÜGGEMEIER/ C. JOERGES, 
Europäisierung des Vertragsrechts und Haftungsrechts, in P.-C. MÜLLER-GRAFF (note 1), at 
312-313. 
10 B. DE SOUSA SANTOS, Law: A Map of Misreading. Towards a Post-Modern 
Conception of Law, [1987] J.L.S. 279, at 298. 
Mel Kenny / Lorna Gillies / James Devenney 
 
 
Yearbook of Private International Law, Volume 13 (2011) 96 
laid down standards, which Member States could exceed through measures of 
upward derogation.11 Different Commission approaches to the drafting of secon-
dary law (EU level) and divergent national transposition practice (national level) 
led to further fragmentation; generating inconsistencies throughout EU secondary 
law and its transposition in national laws. Moreover, fragmentation in its interna-
tional dimension was exacerbated by the communitarisation of aspects of proce-
dural law thereby “disengaging” Member States from the Formulating Agencies’ 
initiatives.12 Simultaneously, lex mercatoria contracting and arbitration, perceived 
as methods by which parties could emancipate themselves from national law, were 
becoming more common. This combination of factors means that polycentricity 
dominates in cross-border trade; a plethora of non-national legal sources, whether 
EU law, lex mercatoria, the CISG rules, the UNIDROIT Principles of International 
Commercial Contracts (“UNIDROIT Principles” 2004) or the 1980 EC Rome 
Convention so became important sources of Private Law. 
Given this fragmentation and polycentricity it is unsurprising that calls for 
the codification of EU Private Law became popular and also that the ius commune 
project became flanked by initiatives aimed at simplifying and improving the 
regulatory environment.13 Simultaneously, however, the realisation grew that, just 
as harmonisation had led to fragmentation, so too could codification: that the 
choice made between liberalisation and regulation always lends the law more of a 
“patchwork” than a “uniform” quality. Finally, with intensifying regulatory compe-
tition the case-law driven phenomenon of “spontaneous” harmonisation became 
more common and further eroded the case for broader codification.14 
 
 
C.  Questioning the Rationale for EU Private Law Consolidation 
The rationale for the (D)CFR initiative has always been connected with ensuring 
the coherence of EU Law. Yet far from creating a consistent body of Consumer 
Law EU harmonisation has led to the emergence of 27 national rules on doorstep 
selling, distance selling, timeshares, package holidays, consumer credit and in each 
other area governed by a relevant secondary law provision.15 Yet while we may 
                                                          
11 Via minimum harmonisation: Art. 114(4) TFEU; See also: Art. 193 TFEU;  
Art. 169(5) TFEU. 
12 B. HEß, Die Integrationsfunktion des Europäischen Zivilverfahrensrechts, [2001] 
IPRax 389, at 395. 
13 European Governance-A White Paper (COM(2001) 428 final), [2001] OJ C 287/1. 
SLIM Initiative (Simpler Legislation for the Internal Market): (COM(1996) 204 final); 
Review of SLIM (COM(2000) 104 final); Simplifying and improving the regulatory 
environment (COM(2001) 726 final); European governance -A white paper, [2001] OJ C 
287/1. 
14 A.I. OGUS, Competition between National Legal Systems: a Contribution of 
Economic Analysis to Comparative law, [1999] I.C.L.Q. 405; E. KIENINGER, Wettbewerb 
der Privatrechtsordnungen im Europäischen Binnenmarkt, Tübingen 2002; N. REICH, 
Competition of Legal Orders–A new Paradigm of EC law?, [1992] 29 C.M.L.Rev. 861. 
15 C. TWIGG-FLESNER, Good-Bye Harmonisation by Directives, Hello Cross-Border 
only Regulation? A way forward for EU Consumer Contract law, (2011) 7 E.R.C.L. 235, at 
241. 
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acknowledge the importance of the motive of “greater coherence”, the full implica-
tions of chasing such an elusive concept remain to be developed. Private lawyers 
are thus drawn into a critical examination of the coherence of EU law. This 
paradigm relies on the forms of action: direct actions (Articles 258 & 259 TFEU); 
judicial review (Article 263 TFEU); preliminary references (Article 267 TFEU); 
actions for non-contractual institutional liability (Art. 340 TFEU). Yet the 
paradigm also relies on the tangible effects of EU law: the doctrines of Direct 
Effect and Supremacy; the specific effects of directives;16 and the doctrine of State 
liability. In theory, this combination produced a comprehensive regime for ensu-
ring the coherence of EU Law, as famously asserted in UPA: 
“…[T]he Treaty has established a complete system of legal remedies 
and procedures designed to ensure judicial review of the legality of 
acts of the institutions, and has entrusted such review to the Com-
munity courts. …(W)here natural or legal persons cannot… directly 
challenge (EU) measures… they are able… either indirectly to plead 
the invalidity of such acts… or to… ask (national courts)(…) to 
make a reference...”17  
Within the “completeness” of this paradigm the CJEU’s (ex ECJ) role is to ensure 
the uniform application of EU Law.18 But the coherence of EU Law has to be 
appreciated as part of the broader issue of compliance.19 This uncovers a perennial 
governance problem, especially acute in a system of indirect administration such as 
in the EU in which policies are implemented decentrally by national executive and 
judicial authorities enjoying margins of discretion.20 A wider understanding of 
coherence is therefore required: coherence as a product of judicial and administra-
tive initiatives.  
Inevitably, the importance attached to Article 267 TFEU meant that the 
coherence of EU Law was doubly compromised: by reliance on litigation and the 
variation in national legal remedies. As Snyder observes, judicial effectiveness is 
therefore: “…less normatively coherent and less comprehensive than a legislative 
scheme… (Furthermore) (d)ifferences in national remedies affect the extent to 
which individuals can rely… on rights derived from Community law…”21 Finally, 
the “incompleteness” of EU Law is buttressed by the basic characteristics of EU 
Law: subsidiarity; national margins of discretion in implementation and judicial 
procedural autonomy; the attributed competences of the EU22; the margins of direct 
and individual concern under Article 263 TFEU; the margins of State liability 
                                                          
16 P. CRAIG/ G. DE BÚRCA, EU LAW, 4th ed., OUP, 2008, at 279-300. 
17 Case C-50/00 P, Unión de Pequeños Agricultores v Council (UPA), [2002] ECR I-
6677, para. 40. 
18 F. MANCINI, The Making of a Constitution for Europe, (1989) 26 C.M.L.Rev. 595, 
at 606: the national legal order reliant on the ECJ’s “unlimited patience”. 
19 F. SNYDER, The Effectiveness of European Community Law: Institutions, 
Processes and Techniques, (1993) 56(1) M.L.R. 19, at 19-20. 
20 Ibid., at 22. 
21 Ibid., at 51. 
22 Articles 2(5), 169 & 114 TFEU. 
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III. Evolution of the (D)CFR/Consolidation Initiative 
Set against the uncertain rationale for greater coherence, this paper now turns to 
mapping the evolution of the (D)CFR initiative. 
 
 
A.  The 2001 Communication on European Contract Law 
The 2001 Communication24 drew particular attention to the divergent transposition 
and uneven operation of EC Contract Law. The Commission sought to initiate 
debate on the need for a consolidation of the contract relevant aspects of secondary 
law along the lines of four options: 
- Option I: not to intervene but to rely on a competition of legal orders; 
- Option II: to elaborate non-binding principles based on the Lando or 
UNIDROIT principles; 
- Option III: to undertake a general evaluation, improvement and consoli-
dation of existing instruments; 
- Option IV: to introduce (a) new legal instrument(s), into which contracting 
parties could either opt-in or opt-out, to consolidate the law. 
The range of options was criticised: opening a discussion on consolidation with a 
non-intervention option arguably revealing the Commission’s result-orientation. 
 
 
B. The 2003 Action Plan  
Unsurprisingly, the 2003 Action Plan25 rejected the 2001 Communication’s non-
intervention option and approved Options II-IV; distilling three areas in which 
further initiatives were required: 
- The Common Frame of Reference (CFR). The CFR was to strengthen the 
quality of the acquis: tackling divergent transpositions and providing guidance to 
questions of interpretation.26 A need was also identified for an overhaul of funda-
                                                          
23 Case C-224/01, Köbler v Austria, [2003] ECR I-10239; Case C-173/03, Traghetti 
del Mediterraneo v Italy, [2006] ECR I-5177. 
24 Communication on European Contract Law (COM(2001) 398 final), [2001] OJ C 
255/1. 
25 Communication on a More Coherent Contract Law – An Action Plan, 
(COM(2003) 68 final.), [2003] OJ C 63/1; D. STAUDENMAYER, The Commission Action 
Plan on European Contract Law, [2003] 2 E.R.P.L. 113. 
26 Case C-168/00, Simone Leitner v TUI Deutschland GmbH & Co. KG, [2002] ECR 
I-2631. 
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mental concepts (conclusion and validity of contracts, non-performance and unjust 
enrichment, representation of foreign companies, formal demands and the ex-
clusion or limitation of liability)27 and to identify areas requiring special treatment 
(financial and insurance services, transfer and reservation of title, cabotage 
transport, factoring, consumer protection and tort law).28 
- EC-wide standard contract terms and conditions. The Commission aiming 
to facilitate the exchange of information on the utility of standardised contract 
terms and conditions.29 
- The opportuneness of new optional instrument(s). In launching an asses-
sment of the need for new optional instrument(s) the Commission sought to supply 
a measure of horizontal coherence to “EC Contract Law”. Guidelines for the elabo-
ration of these measures were mapped out.30 
The 2003 Action Plan appeared to contradict itself: retaining the sector-specific 
approach, whilst underplaying the horizontal implications of its analysis though a 
questioning of the opportuneness of the horizontal optional instrument(s).31 
Furthermore, some questions were not addressed: on the form of the optional 
instrument(s); on the relationship between CFR and the optional instrument(s)); on 
the choice of law; on the proportionality and legitimacy of the reforms. Similarly, 
questions on the availability of the standard terms and conditions in purely 
“internal”, i.e. national, transactions were left unresolved.32 Some of this can be 
explained: given the controversy surrounding the idea of a European Civil Code, 
the project had to be marketed “neutrally”. In this vein, recalling the restrictions 
placed in Tobacco Advertising, the Commission was hardly likely to begin with an 
examination of the appropriate legal base.33 Equally the Commission’s strategy can 
be explained in that policy inertia works to its advantage; the longer the consul-
tative period, the more emphatic the case for reform becomes. 
 
 
C. The 2004 Communication 
A new circumspection emerged following the 2003 Action Plan. In this vein 
BASEDOW appealed for gradualism: to first develop the CFR as a basis for opt-in, 
sector-specific instruments, to convert these into opt-out instruments, and, over 20-
30 years, to extend these instruments horizontally.34 The 2004 Communication also 
appeared to subscribe to gradualism, setting a three-year (2005-2007) research 
                                                          
27 2003 Action Plan (note 25), at paras 32, 33, 34, 35-36. 
28 Ibid., paras 30-31, 47-48, 41-42, 43, 49-50, and 67. 
29 Ibid., paras 81-88 at 21-23. 
30 Ibid., paras 89-97 at 23-24. 
31 M. KENNY, The 2003 Action Plan on European Contract Law: is the Commission 
Running Wild?, [2003] 28 E.L.Rev. 538. 
32 2003 Action Plan (note 25), at 21-23. 
33 Case C-376/98, Germany v Parliament and Council (Tobacco Advertising), [2000] 
ECR I-8419, paras 83 and 84. 
34 J. BASEDOW, Ein optimales Europäisches Vertragsgesetz – opt-in, opt-out, wozu 
überhaupt?, [2004] 12 ZEuP 1, at 4. 
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phase to prepare the CFR,35 following which a drafting stage was to be initiated 
(2008-2009), allowing for CFR adoption by 2009. The 2004 Communication also 
elaborated on the possible Principles of European Contract Law (“PECL”)-based 
structure of the CFR.36 Meanwhile Annex II to the 2004 Communication set out the 
parameters of the opportuneness of the optional instrument. The main points can be 
summarised: 
- The CFR was central to the Communication,37 its main role being to 
improve the acquis through uniform definitions of legal terms, fundamental 
principles and model contract law.38 The CFR was to test the coherence of EU 
secondary law, and, where appropriate, to simplify or codify the relevant sectoral 
framework. In surveying the consumer acquis,39 the 2004 Communication stressed 
the need to combat differences deriving from the patchwork of secondary law and 
from national measures of upward derogation. The Commission also identified 
insurance contracts, contracts of sale and services, clauses relating to the retention 
and transfer of title and late payments as areas in which sector-specific solutions 
were required.40 Surprisingly, on demarcation, the Commission concluded that 
“there are no appreciable problems arising from the differences in the interaction 
between contract law and tort law…”.41 The Commission foresaw that the CFR 
was, initially, to adopt the form of a non-binding instrument. 
- EC-wide standard terms and conditions: an intention to promote the 
simplification of cross-border trade was confirmed. The Commission aimed to 
establish a platform for the information on EU-wide standard terms and conditions 
supplying guidelines on their relationship to the competition rules and identifying 
obstacles to their use.42  
- The optional instrument. The 2004 Communication advocated a single 
optional instrument, acknowledging that it would operate horizontally.  
 
 
                                                          
35 2004 Communication on European contract law and the revision of the Acquis: 
the way forward, COM(2004) 651 final. October 11, 2004, [2005] OJ C 14/6, at 13. 
36 Ibid., Annex I, at 14-16, lends the CFR the structure of the Principles of European 
Contract law. 
37 Ibid., 2-5 functions and legal nature; 9-13 preparation and elaboration; 14-16 
(Annex I) structure. 
38 Ibid., Section 2.1.1., at 3; Section 3.1.3. 
39 Ibid., at 3-4. Desirability of Codification given the interplay of Consumer 
directives: Directive 85/577 on doorstep selling, [1985] OJ L 372/31; Directive 90/314 on 
package travel and holiday tours, [1990] OJ L 158/159; Directive 94/47 the Timeshare 
Directive, [1994] OJ L 280/83; Directive 97/7 on distance selling, [1997] OJ L 144/19; 
Directive 98/6 on consumer protection in the indication of the prices of products offered to 
consumers, [1998] OJ L 80/27; Directive 98/27 on injunctions for the protection of 
consumer interests, [1998] OJ L 166/51; and Directive 1999/44 on certain aspects of the sale 
of consumer goods and associated services, [1999] OJ L 171/12. 
40 Ibid., at 9. 
41 Ibid., at 11. 
42 Ibid., at 6-8. 
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1. Evaluation of the 2004 Communication 
That the “non-Code” was to be developed by the Study Group, indeed the Study 
Group’s dominance in this discourse, confirms a central paradox of this initiative.43 
As regards the sector-specificity of the proposals,44 this appeared compromised; the 
Communication bypassing the legal base question as if it possessed a general 
“residual” competence. Necessarily, the need to resolve demarcational issues 
(between Contract, Property and Tort) as they arise between national legal orders 
extended the project into general Private Law.45 Furthermore, the commitment to a 
single optional instrument confirmed the initiative’s horizontal impact. Meanwhile, 
rather than the analytical starting point, the legal base issue was relegated to the 
last point of Annex II.46 Meanwhile, whilst many features remained unspecified 
(e.g. whether opt-in or opt-out, whether applicable to domestic situations) other 
options (i.e. differentiated integration) were ignored. Moreover, any codificatory 
measures as might emerge would in any case not obviate the need to juridify the 
remaining patchwork of Private Law norms: a Common Law turn, would inevitably 
assume greater importance. As AMSTUTZ anticipated, this would lead to ever-
deeper rearrangements in the Civilian approach.47 Equally, as FARNSWORTH 
observed, this would also lead to a rearrangement of the Common Law approach to 
EC Private Law.48 Finally, as far as proportionality was concerned the fundamental 
question remained of whether it was not more pragmatic to ensure a basic 
framework for judicial cross-border co-operation.49 The important caveat such 
                                                          
43 Inter alia: C. VON BAR/ U. DROBNIG, The Interaction of Contract Law and Tort 
and Property Law in Europe, Munich 2004; W. VAN GERVEN/ J. LEVER/ P. LAROUCHE (eds), 
Cases, Materials and Text on National and International Tort Law, Oxford 2000; R. 
SCHULZE/ A. ENGEL/ J. JONES (eds), Casebook Europäisches Privatrecht, Baden-Baden 
1999; Critically: K. RIEDL, The Work of the Lando-Commission from an Alternative 
Viewpoint, [2000] 8 E.R.P.L. 71. Other approaches: Trento Group on the Common Core of 
European Contract: <www.jus.unitn.it/elsg>; Society of European Contract Law 
(“SECOLA”): <www.secola.org >; European Research Group on Existing EC Private Law 
(Acquis Group): <www.acquisgroup. org>; European Private law Forum: <www.iue.it >; 
W. WURMNEST, Common Core, Grundregeln, Kodifikationsentwürfe, Acquis-Grundsätze-
Ansätze internationaler Wissenschaftlergruppen zur Privatrechtsvereinheitlichung in 
Europa, [2003] 11 ZEuP 714. 
44 Ex Art. 7(1) EC: “Each institution shall act within the limits of the powers 
conferred upon it by this Treaty”. Functional competences: Arts 115 and 114 TFEU; Art. 
352 TFEU. 
45 2004 Communication (note 35), at 9. 
46 Ibid., at 21. 
47 M. AMSTUTZ, Zwischenwelten. Zur Emergenz einer interlegalen Rechtsmethodik 
im europäischen Privatrecht, in C. JOERGES/ G. TEUBNER, Rechtsverfassungsrecht, Baden-
Baden 2003, at 237. 
48 E.A. FARNSWORTH, Modernization and Harmonization of Contract law: and 
American perspective, (2003) Unif. L.R. 97, at 99-100: “The UCC along with our 
Restatements, has given us a system of common law that seems less startlingly different 
from Continental European legal systems than does English Common law”. 
49 Measures Europeanising procedural law: Reg. 44/2001 on jurisdiction and the 
recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, [2001] OJ L 
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cases as Keck and Tobacco Advertising underscored was that not every variance in 
domestic law necessarily threatens the integrity of the market as a whole.50 
 
 
D. Commission’s 2007 Green Paper on the Consumer Acquis 
The 2007 Green Paper marked the opening of a further consultative round.51 Yet as 
the 2007 Green Paper pre-dates the highly illuminating Acquis Report52 a crucial 
opportunity for communication was missed; fuelling suspicion that the Commis-
sion was aiming to orchestrate the debate. This in mind, it is striking that the 2007 
Green Paper simply presented a catalogue of 31 questions. Moreover, in many 
instances, it was clear that for many of the questions there could only be one 
correct answer and a clearly wrong answer was also available. Furthermore, a 
number of the questions were non-questions: who would object to the harmoni-
sation of cooling-off periods?53 Another group of questions were highly specia-
lised: on the sale of second-hand goods at public auctions54 or the transferability of 
the commercial guarantee.55 The 2007 Green Paper thus seemed to map out a more 
modest field of vision: (1) re-dimensioning the “greater coherence” initiative to 
narrower objectives in consumer law; and (2) de-prioritising the work on the CFR 
and Optional Instrument, and embracing, instead, a “mixed approach” (horizontal/ 
vertical) to Consumer Law.56 This strategy was to involve: a Framework Directive 
on EC Consumer Contract Law (horizontal instrument) and a revision and 
improvement of the existing EC Consumer directives (vertical action). 
                                                                                                                                      
12/1; Reg. 1206/2001 on co-operation between the courts of the Member States in the taking 
of evidence in civil or commercial matters, [2001] OJ L 174/1; Reg. 1348/2000 on the 
service in the Member States of judicial and extra-judicial documents in civil or commercial 
matters, [2000] OJ L 160/37; Reg. 1346/2000 on insolvency proceedings, [2000] OJ L 
160/1; Reg. 805/2004 creating a European Enforcement Order for uncontested claims, 
[2004] OJ L 143/15; Directive 2003/8 to improve access to justice in cross-border disputes 
by establishing minimum common rules relating to legal aid for such disputes, [2003] OJ L 
26/41. Finally, proposals on the introduction of a European Payment Procedure COM(2004) 
173. 
50 Joined Cases C-267 & 268/91, Keck and Mithouard, [1993] ECR I-6097; [1995] 1 
C.M.L.Rev. 101, at paras 16-17; Joined Cases C-401 & 402/92, Tankstation t’ Heukste and 
J.B.E. Boermans, [1994] ECR I-2199, para. 12; N. REICH, The November Revolution of the 
Court of Justice: Keck, Meng and Audi Revisited, [1994] 31 C.M.L.Rev. 459;  
S. WEATHERILL, After Keck: Some Thoughts on how to Clarify the Clarification, [1996] 33 
C.M.L.Rev. 885. Limits of legislative competence: Tobacco (note 33). 
51 2007 Green Paper on the Consumer Acquis, COM(2006) 744 final, 8 February 
2007. Following: Commission’s 1st Annual Progress Report on contract law and acquis 
review 2005, COM(2005) 456 final. 
52 EC Consumer Law Compendium – Comparative Analysis 2006 (H. SCHULTE-
NOELKE (ed.)), available at <http://ec. europa.eu/consumers/cons_int/safe_shop/acquis/ 
comp_analysis_en.pdf> . 
53 Ibid., s.4.8.1, Question F1, at 20-21. 
54 Ibid., s.5.2, Question H2, at 24-25. 
55 Ibid., s.5.10.2, Question M2, at 31. 
56 Ibid., Option II, point 4.2 Option II: the mixed approach at 8-9. 
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1. Evaluation of the 2007 Green Paper 
The Commission’s position is to be set in a context of institutional support,57 this 
notwithstanding continuing legal base objections to the initiative.58 Yet even the 
“mixed approach” of the 2007 Green Paper contained some controversial aspects 
which would radically redefine the relationship between EU and national 
Consumer Law and expand the (horizontal?) reach of the approach: the apparent 
advocacy of a broader conceptualisation of the EU consumer (embracing the small 
business, the professional, entrepreneur and intermediary59), a tendency to the 
constrict freedom of contract (restrictions of liability on used goods and standard 
terms and conditions) and advocacy of an asymmetric norm on good faith on 
business in B2C transactions.60 Such amendments would not be available without a 
shift of competence to the centre and a Treaty revision.61 
 
 
E. The (D)CFR 
In 2009 Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of European Private Law: Draft 
Common Frame of Reference (DCFR) was finally published62 and the magnitude of 
this work is striking: 
“The following volumes contain the results of the work of the Study 
Group on a European Civil Code…and the Research Group on 
Existing EC Private Law... Nearly two hundred and fifty people of 
different generations collaborated in the research groups over a pe-
riod of more than twenty five years. They have reflected important 
areas of private law…The perspective is thoroughly European 
and…[m]odel rules, with comments and notes, bring together rules 
                                                          
57 Respectively: 2,784th Council meeting, February 19, 2007. Press Release 
6044/07, p. 12. European Parliament Resolution of March 23, 2006 on European contract 
law and the revision of the acquis: the way forward, (2005/2022(INI)), available at 
<www.europarl.europa.eu>.  
58 Tobacco Advertising (note 33), at para. 84; Case C-210/03, R. v Secretary of State 
for Health (Swedish Match), [2000] ECR I-11893, paras 26, 30-32, 34 and 68; S. 
WEATHERILL (note 3), at 646. 
59 Green Paper 2007 (note 51), at s. 4.2, Question B2, Option 2, p. 16-17. 
60 B. HEIDERHOFF/ M. KENNY, The Commission’s 2007 Green Paper on the 
Consumer Acquis: deliberate deliberation?, (2007) 32 E.L.Rev. 740. 
61 S. WEATHERILL, The Constitutional Competence of the EU to Deliver Social 
Justice, (2006) E.R.C.L. 2, at 136-158; S. WEATHERILL/ S. VOGENAUER, The European 
Community’s Competence for a Comprehensive Harmonisation of Contract Law- an 
Empirical Analysis, (2005) 30 E.L. Rev. 821, at 826. 
62 C. VON BAR/ E. CLIVE (eds), Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of European 
Private Law: Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR), Oxford 2010. 
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derived largely from the legal systems of the Member States and the 
over-arching Community law.” 63 
The (D)CFR was published in six volumes, straddling ten “books”, and including 
provisions relating to: general Contract Law (Books II & III); specific types of 
contracts such as contracts relating to personal security (Book IV, Part G) and sales 
contracts (Book IV, Part A); non-contractual obligations (Book VI); Unjustified 
Enrichment (Book VII); and Trusts Law (Book X). However, perhaps the most 
hotly debated aspect of the (D)CFR was its ultimate purpose: was the (D)CFR a 
blueprint for a European Civil Code or was it, for example, merely to be used as a 
luxury toolbox?64 That controversy was partly fuelled by the EU Commission’s 
Green Paper on policy options for progress towards a European Contract Law for 
consumers and businesses65 in which the Commission set out a number of options 
for the future of EU Contract Law which included: a Regulation establishing a 
European Civil Code (Option 7); a Regulation establishing a European Contract 
Law (Option 6); a Directive on European Contract Law (Option 5); and an optional 
instrument (Option 4). Yet, it soon became clear that an optional instrument was 
the most likely, and politically acceptable, option.66 The essential idea of an 
optional instrument was set out in the EU Commission’s Green Paper on policy 
options for progress towards a European Contract Law for consumers and 
businesses: 
“A Regulation could set up an optional instrument, which would be 
conceived as a 2nd Regime in each Member State, thus providing 
parties with an option between two regimes of domestic contract 
law. It would insert into the national laws of the 27 Member States a 
comprehensive…self-standing set of contract law rules which could 
be chosen by the parties…It would provide parties, primarily those 
wishing to operate in the internal market, with an alternative set of 
rules. The instrument could be applicable in cross-border contracts 
only, or in both cross-border and domestic contracts…”67 
It also became clear that the scope of any legislative “CFR” would be much 
narrower than the (D)CFR, and indeed would probably relate to sales and some 
services contracts.68 However, beyond these indications, there was uncertainty on a 
number of issues including: the extent to which such an instrument would cover 
both business-to-business contracts and business-to-consumer contracts; whether 
                                                          
63 Ibid., at 1. 
64 See, generally, S. VOGENAUER, Common Frame of Reference and UNIDROIT 
Principles of International Commercial Contracts: Coexistence, Competition, or Overkill of 
Soft Law? (2010) 6 E.R.C.L. 143. 
65 COM(2010) 348 final. 
66 J. DEVENNEY/ M. KENNY, Unfair Terms and the Draft Common Frame of 
Reference: The Role of Non-Legislative Harmonisation and Administrative Co-Operation?, 
in J. DEVENNEY/ M. KENNY, European Consumer Protection: Theory and Practice, 
forthcoming, CUP, 2012. 
67 COM(2010) 348 final. 
68 See, generally, S. VOGENAUER (note 64). 
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the instrument would be limited to cross-border transactions; the exact scope of the 
instrument; and, most importantly for this paper, the precise Private International 
Law dimensions to such an instrument. This uncertainty continued with the 
appointment of an Expert Group in 2010,69 its task being to: 
“…conduct a feasibility study on a draft instrument of European 
contract law whatever its legal form or nature. Given that the 
Commission had yet to take a formal position on any of the options 
set out in the Green Paper, the Expert Group was asked to work on 
an “as if” basis drafting a study that could be used in different 
scenarios.”70 
The next significant date was June 2011 when Commissioner REDING, speaking at 
a conference in Leuven,71 gave her support to the idea of an optional instrument: 
“I have come to the conclusion that as regards contract law, we need 
a new approach…that on the one hand helps bring about the single 
market…while on the other hand respects Europe’s legal diversity 
and the principle of subsidiarity. For me, this can be achieved by 
proposing a legal instrument on European Contract Law that is 
voluntary and optional. That can be chosen by businesses and 
consumers and then serves as basis for their transactions. That does 
not replace existing national contract law, but that would exist 
alongside it.”72 
Yet, at that stage, there were still a number of issues to be resolved including, of 
particular relevance in the current context, the Private International Law 
dimensions to any optional instrument: 
“We are still discussing the details of how this optional instrument 
should look like, and notably what should be its exact private 
international law effects. But one thing is clear: Nobody will be 
forced to use the optional instrument. The bottom line is choice. 
Only those who choose the instrument will be able to contract under 
it. Those who do not want to use it will continue to contract under 
national laws…It is…a very procompetitive way: the optional 
instrument will only become a success if many businesses and 
                                                          
69 Commission Decision 2010/233/EU; (2010) OJ L 105/109. 
70 Expert Group’s Feasibility Study, p. 5 (emphasis added), available at 
<http://ec.europa.eu/justice/contract/expert-group/index_en.htm>. 
71 Towards a European Contract Law co-organised by the Study Centre for 
Consumer Law of the Catholic University of Leuven and the Centre for European Private 
Law of the University of Münster (Leuven, 3 June 2011). 
72 Commissioner REDING, The Next Steps Towards a European Contract Law for 
Businesses and Consumers, available at <http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do? 
reference=SPEECH/11/411&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en>.  
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consumers will find it attractive to make use of it for their 
transactions.”73 
Thereafter, in August 2011, a draft was produced which contained: provisions of 
“general” Contract Law (see Part II, III & VI); provisions on the obligations and 
remedies of the parties to a sales contract or a contract for the supply of digital 
content (Part IV); and provisions on the obligations and remedies of the parties to a 
related service contract (Part V).74 Thereafter rumours began to emerge that a full 
proposal would be published in October 2011.  
 
 
F.  The (Proposed) Common European Sales Law 
These rumours were true and on 11th October 2011 a proposed (optional) Common 
European Sales Law (CESL) was published75 which adopted a similar structure to 
the August 2011 draft. Article 3 of the proposal states that: 
“The parties may agree that the Common European Sales Law 
governs their cross-border contracts for the sale of goods, for the 
supply of digital content and for the provision of related services 
within the territorial, material and personal scope as set out in 
Articles 4 to 7.”76 
Article 7 of the proposal states: 
“The Common European Sales Law may be used only if the seller of 
goods or the supplier of digital content is a trader. Where all the 
parties to a contract are traders, the Common European Sales Law 
may be used if at least one of those parties is a small or medium-
sized enterprise («SME»).” 
Yet, significantly, it is proposed that Member States be given the power to extend 
the use of the CESL: 
“A Member State may decide to make the Common European Sales 
Law available for: 
(a) contracts where the habitual residence of the traders or, in the 
case of a contract between a trader and a consumer, the habitual 
residence of the trader, the address indicated by the consumer, the 
delivery address for goods and the billing address, are located in that 
Member State; and/or 
                                                          
73 Ibid. 
74 Available at <http://ec.europa.eu/justice/contract/index_en.htm>. 
75 Available at <http://ec.europa.eu/justice/contract/files/common_sales_law/ 
regulation_sales_law_en.pdf>.  
76 Emphasis added. 
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(b) contracts where all the parties are traders but none of them is an 




IV. Reflections on the (Proposed) Common European 
Sales Law 
The proposed CESL will no doubt stimulate much debate; and that debate is likely 
to include issues related to the methodology adopted in the (D)CFR; the drafting of 
the CESL;78 the assumptions underpinning the need for an optional instrument;79 
and the precise Private International Law implications of an optional instrument. 
The latter will be discussed in Part IV of this paper; in this section of the paper we 
will discuss four further issues/challenges for the CESL: 
- fragmentation; 
- consistency of interpretation; 
- the impact of social, cultural and economic norms; and 




In relation to fragmentation, we have already noted that existing EU initiatives in 
this area have been criticized on the ground that they have resulted in fragmen-
                                                          
77 Proposed Article 13. 
78 Prior to the publication of the proposed CESL, the Department for Business, Skills 
and Innovation and Ministry of Justice asked the Law Commission and the Scottish Law 
Commission to provide advice to the UK Government on the idea of an optional instrument: 
see: <http://www.scotlawcom.gov.uk/law-reform-projects/contract-law-in-light-of-the-draft-
common-frame-of-reference-dcf/>. Shortly after the publication of the proposed CESL, the 
Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission published their advice to the UK 
Government: An Optional Common European Sales Law: Advantages and Problems Advice 
to the UK Government (November 2011), available at 
<http://www.justice.gov.uk/lawcommission/docs/Common_European_Sales_Law_Advice.p
df>. In that advice the Law Commissions had their doubts about the proposal which, they 
argued, was not always easy to follow: “Distance selling needs its own clear rules, designed 
around automated processes. The CESL is based on more general contract law principles 
and we think that it would benefit from greater focus on distance sales. More could be done 
to clarify when the contract is formed; the effect of a change of circumstances; and unfair 
terms protection. Provisions on the transfer of property could also usefully be inserted” (S. 
14). 
79 In their advice the Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission were not 
convinced about the merits of pursuing a CESL in relation to commercial contracting (S.51). 
The Law Commissions were, however, more supportive of a CESL for some consumer sales 
(S.51): “We think efforts would be better spent on developing a European code for 
consumer sales over the internet, where there is stronger evidence that the current variety of 
contract laws inhibits the single market.” 
Mel Kenny / Lorna Gillies / James Devenney 
 
 
Yearbook of Private International Law, Volume 13 (2011) 108 
tation. Yet the proposed CESL would also result in fragmentation, albeit that that 
fault lines may have shifted. More specifically the CESL does not cover all aspects 
of the sales relationship: 
“All the matters…that are not addressed…are governed by the pre-
existing rules of the national law…under Regulations (EC) No 
593/2008 and (EC) No 864/2007 or any other relevant conflict of 
law rule. These issues include legal personality, the invalidity of a 
contract arising from lack of capacity, illegality…the language of the 
contract, matters of non-discrimination, representation, plurality of 
debtors and creditors, change of parties…set-off and merger, 
property law including the transfer of ownership, intellectual 
property law and the law of torts.”80  
In addition there is also the question of the interaction between the CESL and (non-
harmonised) areas of law outside of the CESL. Here we are reminded of the work 
of two of the present authors on the protection of non-professional sureties.81 Surety 
transactions are an interesting case study for any harmonisation agenda as such 
contracts are polycontextual in nature; in other words such transactions transcend 
traditional legal boundaries. Thus surety transactions involve aspects of: 
- Specific Suretyship Law; 
- Contract Law; 
- Consumer Law; 
- Insolvency Law; 
- Family Law;  
- Constitutional Law; 
- Property Law. 
The key point for present purposes is that, whilst most Member States have 
attempted to increase surety protection, there is marked diversity in the means 
used.82 In particular surety protection in individual Member States involves 
different complex orchestrations of these legal fields, concepts and mechanisms.83 
This may mean that tinkering with one of these elements may have very different 
consequences in different Member States.84 Similarly harmonising zones of the 
                                                          
80 Proposed Recital 27. 
81 M. KENNY/ J. DEVENNEY, The Fallacy of the Common Core: Polycontextualism in 
Surety Protection – a Hard Case in Harmonisation Discourse, in M. ANDENÆS/ C. ANDERSEN 
(eds), The Theory and Practice of Harmonisation (forthcoming, Edward Elgar Publishing, 
2012). 
82 See A. COLOMBI CIACCHI, Non-legislative Harmonisation of Private Law under 
the European Constitution: the Case of Unfair Suretyships, (2005) 13 E.R.P.L. 297. 
83 See J. DEVENNEY/ M. KENNY, Unfair Terms, Surety Transactions and European 
Harmonisation: a Crucible of Europeanised Private Law?, [2009] Conveyancer and 
Property Lawyer 295. 
84 See M. KENNY/ J. DEVENNEY, The Fallacy of the Common Core: Polycon-
textualism in Surety Protection – a Hard Case in Harmonisation Discourse, in M. ANDENÆS/ 
C. ANDERSEN (note 81). 
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B.  Consistency of Interpretation 
Turning to the issue of consistency of interpretation, one of the advantages of an 
optional instrument envisaged by the EU Commission’s Green Paper on policy 
options for progress towards a European Contract Law for consumers and busi-
nesses was that: 
“Consistent reference to a single body of rules would remove the 
necessity for judges and legal practitioners to investigate in certain 
cases foreign laws, which is currently the case under conflict-of-law 
rules. This could not only reduce costs for businesses, but also 
alleviate the administrative load on the judicial system.”85 
The central difficulty, of course, relates to ensuring both consistency of inter-
pretation throughout all Member States and a “European” approach to the inter-
pretation of any CESL when, under existing Europeanized Private Law, there has 
been some notable unevenness in interpretation throughout the EU.86 Indeed even 
within the same Member State there has sometimes been some unevenness of 
interpretation.87 The latter point can be illustrated by reference to the case law88 in 
England and Wales on the vexed question of (in effect) whether or not the Unfair 
Terms Directive applies to non-professional surety transactions.89 From a formal 
perspective, a difficulty with applying the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts 
Regulations 1999 (the Regulations which seek to transpose the Unfair Terms 
Directive in England and Wales) to such transactions is that (assuming that the 
surety can be classified as a “consumer” for the purposes of the Regulations) it is 
the non-professional surety who supplies the service; whereas the creditor, as 
beneficiary of the agreement, will usually be acting in the course of business.90 
Therefore this question is part of the much wider debate as to whether or not, for 
the purposes of the Regulations, the consumer must be the recipient of goods or 
services.91 
                                                          
85 COM(2010)348 final (emphasis added). 
86 See J. DEVENNEY/ M. KENNY (note 83). 
87 Ibid. 
88 See, generally, J. DEVENNEY, Gordian knots in Europeanised private law: unfair 
terms, bank charges and political compromises, (2011) 62 N.I.L.Q. 33. 
89 See G. MCCORMACK, Protection of Surety Guarantors in England – Prophylactics 
and Procedure, in A. COLOMBI CIACCHI (ed.), Protection of Non-Professional Sureties in 
Europe: Formal and Substantive Disparity, Baden-Baden 2007, at 172-173. 
90 See J. O’DONOVAN/ J. PHILLIPS, The Modern Contract of Guarantee, London 
2003, p. 223.  
91 See H.G. Beale (ed.), Chitty on Contracts, 30th edn., London 2008, at para. 15-
032. 
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Support for the view that the Regulations do apply to surety transactions can 
be found in the Opinion of the European Court of Justice in Bayerische 
Hypothetken- und Wechselbank v. Dietzinger.92 In that case the European Court of 
Justice had to consider the applicability of Council Directive 85/577/EEC (on 
contracts negotiated away from business premises) to surety transactions. In a 
Judgment, which is not without controversy,93 the European Court of Justice stated 
that: 
“…it is apparent from the wording of Article 1 of Directive 85/577 
and from the ancillary nature of guarantees that the directive covers 
only a guarantee ancillary to a contract whereby, in the context of 
“doorstep selling”, a consumer assumes obligations towards the 
trader with a view to obtaining goods or services from him. Further-
more, since the directive is designed to protect only consumers, a 
guarantee comes within the scope of the directive only where, in 
accordance with the first indent of Article 2, the guarantor has 
entered into a commitment for a purpose which can be regarded as 
unconnected with his trade or profession.”94 
In reaching this conclusion, which gives a glimpse of how the CJEU might 
approach this issue in the context of the Unfair Terms Directive,95 the European 
Court of Justice noted that nothing in the Doorstep Selling Directive required “the 
person concluding the contract under which goods or services are to be supplied be 
the person to whom they are supplied”96 and that surety agreements are merely 
ancillary to the main contract.97 Returning to the case law in England and Wales, in 
Barclays Bank Plc v. Kufner98 Field J., relying heavily on the Opinion of the 
European Court of Justice in Bayerische Hypothetken- und Wechselbank v. 
Dietzinger99 - held that surety transactions are not excluded from the scope of the 
Regulations.100 By contrast in Bank of Scotland v. Singh101 Judge Kershaw QC, 
                                                          
92 Case C-45/96, Dietzinger, [1998] ECR I-1199. 
93 See M. KENNY, Standing Surety in Europe: Common Core or Tower of Babel, 
(2007) M.L.R. 175, at 180. 
94 Dietzinger (note 92), at para. 20. Although cf. Berliner Kindl Brauerei AG v. 
Andreas Siepert, [2000] ECR 1-1741, paras 25-26, where the European Court of Justice, in 
considering Council Directive 87/102/EEC for the approximation of the laws, regulations 
and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning consumer credit, noted: 
“…the scope of the Directive cannot be widened to cover contracts of guarantee solely on 
the ground that such agreements are ancillary to the principal agreement whose performance 
they underwrite, since there is no support for such an interpretation in the wording of the 
Directive…or in its scheme and aims.” 
95 See H.G. BEALE (ed.) (note 91), at para. 44-139. 
96 Dietzinger (note 92), at para.19.  
97 Ibid., at para. 18. 
98 [2008] EWHC 2319 (Comm). 
99 Dietzinger (note 92). 
100 Kufner (note 98), at para. 28. 
101 (QBD, unreported, 17th June 2005). 
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apparently operating closer to the actual wording of the Regulations, held that the 
Regulations did not apply to surety transactions and his view has subsequently 
been described as “compelling”102 and “convincing”.103  
Of course an efficient and robust reference process to the CJEU might act as 
an interpretative compass for any CESL. Yet the existing reference procedure is 
not always perceived as having such qualities. Thus in Page v. Combined Shipping 
and Trading Co Ltd104 Staughton LJ famously stated: 
“…the French, German and Italian versions all of which use the 
word «normal/normale» instead of «proper». That does not neces-
sarily mean the same as «normal» in English; similarities in language 
can be deceptive…we ought to conclude that Mr Page has a good 
arguable case…It may well be that when this comes to trial we shall 
have to refer the problem to the European court, and it will take 
another two years after that before a decision emerges as to what the 
regulation really means. Maybe the parties will think there are better 
methods of spending their time and their money than disputing that 
for a long period of time.” 
 
 
C.  Application of Rules 
Moreover, even if a particular rule is being interpreted consistently throughout the 
EU, the application may be different as a result of local considerations. To some 
extent, this was recognised in Freiburger Kommunalbauten GmbH Baugesellschaft 
& Co. KG v. Ludger Hofstetter and Ulrike Hofstetter105 where the ECJ noted that it 
“may interpret general criteria used by the Community legislation in order to 
define the concept of unfair terms. However, it should not rule on the application 
of these general criteria to a particular term”.106 More specifically this issue can be 
illustrated by the interaction of the unfairness test under the Unfair Terms Directive 
and background rules: 
“the application of the same general criterion in two Member States 
may give rise to very different decisions, as a result of the diver-
gences between the rules of substantive law that apply to different 
contracts. Hence harmonisation under the Directive is more apparent 
than real.”107 
                                                          
102 Manches LLP v. Carl Freer, [2006] EWHC 991, at para. 25, per Judge Philip 
Price QC. 
103 Williamson v. Governor of the Bank of Scotland, [2006] EWHC 1289, at para. 46 
per George Bompas QC, sitting as a Deputy Judge. 
104 [1996] C.L.C. 1952, at 1956. 
105 [2004] ECR-I 3403. 
106 Ibid., at para. 22. 
107 Report on Directive 93/13/EEC on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts, 
COM(2000) 248 final, at 30. 
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Thus in UK Housing Alliance (North West) Ltd v. Francis108 the (non-harmonised) 
protection that could be offered by courts in England and Wales in possession 
proceedings contributed to a finding that a term in a sale and leaseback arrange-
ment was not unfair under the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 
1999. An allied point is that the social, cultural and economic norms in a particular 
Member State may affect the application of some of the tests under any optional 
instrument. Again this may be illustrated by the Unfair Terms Directive, which is 
transposed in the UK by Regulation 5(1), Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts 
Regulations 1999: 
“A contractual term which has not been individually negotiated shall 
be regarded as unfair if, contrary to the requirement of good faith, it 
causes a significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations 
arising under the contract, to the detriment of the consumer.” 
Of course pivotal to the operation of Regulation 5 is how “good faith” is con-
ceptualised.109 This was an issue addressed by Lord Bingham in Director General 
of Fair Trading v. First National Bank plc110 where His Lordship stated: 
“Good faith in this context is not an artificial or technical concept; 
nor, since Lord Mansfield was its champion, is it a concept wholly 
unfamiliar to British lawyers. It looks to good standards of com-
mercial morality and practice.”111 
The key point for present purposes is that such a test is inevitably loaded with 
social, cultural and economic norms and there are differences in such norms 
throughout the EU.112 
 
 
D.  Consumer Protection and Enforcement 
Commissioner Reding has noted that: “The right balance between business and 
consumer interests is…key to the success of the optional instrument.”113 By 
contrast, the Expert Group’s Feasibility Study stated:114 
                                                          
108 [2010] EWCA Civ 117. 
109 See generally M. KENNY/ J. DEVENNEY/ L. FOX O’MAHONY, Conceptualising 
Unconscionability in Europe: in the Kaleidoscope of Private and Public Law, in M. KENNY/ 
J. DEVENNEY/ L. FOX O’MAHONY (eds), Unconscionability in European Private Financial 
Transactions: Protecting the Vulnerable, Cambridge 2010, at 377. 
110 [2002] UKHL 52. 
111 Ibid., at para.17.  
112 P. O’CALLAGHAN, Protection from Unfair Suretyships in Ireland, in A. COLOMBI 
CIACCHI (note 89). 
113 Commissioner REDING, The Next Steps Towards a European Contract Law for 
Businesses and Consumers, June 2011. 
114 See (note 70), at 6. 
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“As part of the feasibility study, the Commission tasked the Expert 
Group with drafting contract law rules which would afford con-
sumers a high level of protection in business-to consumer contracts.” 
The argument is essentially that in order to induce consumers to use the optional 
instrument, the level of consumer protection needs to be high. If so, careful thought 
needs to be given to the enforcement of consumer protection provisions in any 
optional instrument. For example, the role of collective proceedings in the regu-
lation of unfair terms, consumers often not having the information, resources and/ 




V. Private International Dimensions to the CESL 
A.  The CESL: An Optional Set of National Contract Law Rules  
As a set of second order rules,116 Private International Law seeks to regulate the 
related questions of which court has judicial authority to hear a dispute with a 
foreign element, what law applies to such disputes and how a judgment from one 
court is recognised and enforced in another court. The current “third wave” 117 of 
European-led Private International Law is of increasing importance not only in 
regulating118 the appropriate application of substantive laws to commercial and 
personal disputes, but also in ensuring that private rights are recognised through 
the choice of law process.119 In the fifteen years since the Treaty of Amsterdam, the 
EU’s competence in the field of Justice and Home Affairs has enabled the EU to 
extend internal and affirm external competence in matters relating to “the conflict 
of laws and jurisdiction.”120 Such competence in foro exterior has been justified, 
                                                          
115 H. BEALE, Legislative Control of Fairness: The Directive on Unfair Terms in 
Consumer Contracts, in J. BEATSON/ D. FRIEDMANN (eds), Good Faith and Fault in Contract 
Law, Clarendon/ Oxford 1995. 
116 H. MUIR-WATT, The Role of the conflict of laws in European private law, in C. 
TWIGG-FLESNER (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to European Union Private Law, 
Cambridge 2010; A. MILLS, The Confluence of Public and Private International Law, 
Justice, Pluralism and Subsidiarity in the International Constitutional Ordering of Private 
Law, Cambridge 2010. 
117 L. GILLIES, “Re-Conceptualising Conflicts Justice via the Approximation of 
Residual Jurisdiction in EC 44/2001” on file with author. 
118 H. MUIR-WATT, note 116 at p.54 Private International Law as Global 
Governance: From Closet to Planet, Research Paper for the launch of the Private 
International Law as Global Governance Research Programme, available at 
<http://blogs.sciences-po.fr/pilagg/>.  
119 Case C-148/02, Garcia v Belgium, [2003] ECR I-11613; Case C-353/06 Grunkin 
and Paul, [2008] ECR I-7639 ; Negrepontis-Giannisis v Greece, Application No.56759/08, 
unreported 3 May 2011, ECHR. 
120 Article 65, TEU, Article 81 TFEU; Regulation EC 593/2008 on the Law 
Applicable to Contractual Obligations (hereafter the “Rome I Regulation”), Recitals (4) and 
(6). 
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and confirmed by the Court of Justice,121 on the premise of responding to the needs 
of the internal market122 either on the basis of such rules impeding one of the 
fundamental freedoms or distorting competition.123 As stated earlier, the effective 
application of the CESL will depend upon its interaction with the Rome I 
Regulation,124 when enacted as a second (or supplementary), optional125 substantive 
Contract Law applicable to contracts conducted between the EU Member States. 
Parties situated in different jurisdictions must be able to ascertain with certainty the 
law applicable to their obligations and the consequential effect of those laws in 
order, as FENTIMAN alludes, to assess and determine transaction and litigation risks 
associated with commercial activities.126 Two key issues raised by the recent Joint 
Law Commissions of England and Wales and Scotland’s Report127 on the proposed 
CESL instrument questioned not only its justification but its anticipated 
effectiveness as a supplementary set of substantive contract rules for cross-border 
sales. An important point raised by that Joint Report was whether the proposal, in 
addition to applying to cross-border sales, ought to be extended to sales conducted 
internally within a Member State.128 Such matters are relevant to the private 
international lawyer when determining whether the law of a given State or, in the 
case of the United Kingdom, a particular part of that State is to apply to a contract. 
Whilst it is fully recognised that the CESL does not purport a choice of either a 
separate law or system of law,129 its interaction with existing choice of law rules for 
contractual obligations in business to business and business to consumer 
transactions in the Rome I Regulation are worthy of examination. It will also 
consider the potential interaction of the proposal with the provisions in the Rome I 
Regulation regarding mandatory rules. Since the CESL is an “optional” limb of 
Contract Law, it is suggested that the impact of the proposed instrument with the 
Rome I Regulation will be limited to only those situations where the parties have 
made an express choice of law (Article 3). Its impact as a targeted maximum 
harmonisation measure in regulating contractual regulations ergo the substantive 
law of a cross-border consumer contract has the potential to (i) increase business 
confidence by reducing related compliance costs and, in the case of cross-border 
                                                          
121 Opinion 1/03 of the Court on the competence of the Community to conclude the 
new Lugano Convention on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments 
in civil and commercial matters, [2006] ECR I-1145. 
122 Article 114 TFEU. 
123 A. DICKINSON, European Private International Law: Embracing New Horizons or 
Mourning the Past?, 2005 J.P.I.L. 197, at 216. 
124 A point alluded to in the proposal; COM(2011) 635 final, at 5-6. 
125 M. W. HESSELINK, How to Opt Into the Common European Sales Law? Brief 
Comments on the Commission’s Proposal for a Regulation, Amsterdam Law School Legal 
Studies Research Paper No. 2011-43/Centre for the Study of European Contract Law 
Working Paper No. 2011-15, available at <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1950107>, (accessed 16 
January 2012), p. 12. 
126 R. FENTIMAN, International Commercial Litigation, Oxford 2010. 
127 The Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission, above (note 78). 
128 Ibid., at S. 18. 
129 M. W. HESSELINK (note 124), at 1. 
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consumer contracts, (ii) improve protection for the “active consumer” (a consumer 
who transacts with a business located in another Member State).130 To that extent, 
the ability of the consumer to be able to sue the business in his home jurisdiction 




B. The CESL, and the Rome I Regulation: Business to Business Contracts  
1.  Article 3: Freedom of Choice 
The starting point in the Rome I Regulation for determining the applicable law of a 
business-to-business sales contract is Article 3. Under Article 3(1), provided the 
matter is of a “civil or commercial nature,” parties are free to select (and vary) the 
law applicable to their contractual obligations. Such a choice has to be “expressed 
or demonstrated with reasonable certainty.” As far as the “law applicable to their 
contractual relations” is concerned, the law must be that of a territorial unit (that is, 
the law of a country) or in accordance with Recital 13, a system of law (such as the 
CISG). This distinction is significant when considering the potential interaction 
between the CESL and Article 3 of the Rome I Regulation. Recital 14 of the Rome 
I Regulation explains that the application of codified Community rules on substan-
tive contract law, such as the draft Common Frame of Reference and now the 
proposed CESL, are also is a permitted choices. Therefore, the CESL is novel in 
the sense that it is a particularised, or as HESSELINK remarks hybrid,132 set of (EU 
private) law rules for cross-border contracts. Since the proposed vehicle for imple-
menting the proposal is a Regulation, its temporal scope would become a new 
branch or limb within the national contract laws of the Member States. The crux of 
the proposal for the CESL, like the Rome I Regulation itself, is based on party 
autonomy. Provided the choice in favour of the optional instrument has been 
expressly made, the CESL may be selected by the parties as the applicable law of a 
Member State. On a number of occasions the proposal makes it clear that the rules 
are intended to be secondary to existing national contract laws. Therefore, one of 
the key benefits of the CESL proposal is that it increases the parties’ choice of 
applicable law within the law of a territorial unit. The practical impact of the 
proposal will be the extent to which it is the proposals are more attractive to 
businesses in place of their national law as their standard choice of law. 
 
 
                                                          
130 On the assumption that the measure offers greater protection through targeted 
maximum harmonisation than currently offered to such consumers; on which see  
M. W. HESSELINK (note 124), at 3. 
131 Regulation EC 44/2001 is currently under review: COM(2010) 748 FINAL (COD 
2010/0383), 14 December 2010.  
132 See M. W. HESSELINK’S discussion on the “national” emphasis of the proposal 
(note 124), at 6. 
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2.  Scope of CESL: An Improved Option for Businesses? 
Rather than operating as a system of law such as an international Convention or 
instrument,133 the CESL only enters the picture when a particular national law has 
been identified and agreed upon as the applicable law. However, increased choice 
comes at a price. If the objective of the proposal is essentially for traders to 
anticipate and thereby limit transaction and litigation risk, the “optional” nature of 
the proposal will inevitably mean that traders will have to make an additional risk 
assessment particular to their business and its operations and only then decide 
whether or not to opt in to the CESL in place of their “standard” existing choice of 
law national contract laws. Even if the parties contract stipulates the CESL in 
accordance with Article 3(1), as with any other choice of law, it is subject to 
overriding mandatory rules of the lex fori (Article 9(2) or the lex loci solutionis 
(Article 9(3)). A basic scenario may be presented. Two businesses, each located in 
different Member States, enter into a contract of sale. Asssuming no prior course of 
regular dealing or a change to the applicable law as a result of prior dealing, it is at 
this stage that the choice of the CESL may be selected. At this point, the seller is 
likely to impose his own law by way of agreement in the contract. Such an 
agreement must be valid (i.e. expressed or demonstrated with reasonable certainty) 
in accordance with Article 3. However, by virtue of Article 9, overriding 
mandatory provisions may circumvent or limit the parties’ choice either when such 
provisions are applicable in accordance with the lex fori or the lex loci solutionis 
(normally the place of performance, such as the place delivery of the goods under 
the contract of sale if different from the lex fori or the lex loci contractus). 
Therefore, if the parties agreed a choice of law and within that choice 
selected the CESL as the opt-in limb of the applicable law, in theory it it would be 
potentially more straightforward for both parties to predict the consequences of 
their contractual relations than if the basic standard contract law of the seller’s 
habitual residence was selected (subject to mandatory rules). This does not 
necessarily mean however that the seller would wish to forgo the standard 
substantive contract rules where it is based. Given that the objective of the proposal 
is a maximum harmonisation instrument, it is hard not to view the effect of this 
proposal as anything other than a set of opt-in EU wide mandatory provisions. In 
addition to its limited application when selected as an optional national law, the 
proposal is also restricted to contracts having connections to Member States. 
A question raised by the recent United Kingdom’s Law Commissions’ joint 
report was whether the CESL should apply to internal contracts within a Member 
State as well as to contracts with foreign elements.134 This question raises an 
interesting wider issue related to the nature of the CESL (whether a system of law 
in itself or as an optional limb of national law). It also highlights that businesses 
with compliance costs and greater transaction risk due to cross-border selling are 
the focus of attention of this proposal, not necessarily businesses competing and 
operating within the same Member State. A consideration of the interaction 
                                                          
133 On the potential “interaction” between the CESL and the CISG (which does not 
apply in the United Kingdom) see M. W. HESSELINK (note 124), at 3 et seq. and Recital 25 
of the proposal. 
134 The Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission, (note 127).  
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between the CESL and Articles 3(3) and 3(4) of the Rome I Regulation is still 
instructive. For example if two businesses are both situated in France and entered 
into a contract of sale, one could reasonably assume that French Law ought to meet 
both parties’ reasonable expectations. As currently proposed, the CESL could not 
be selected by the parties where the matter is internal within a Member State. 
However, if the parties selected German Law to govern their contract on the basis 
that performance of the contract was to take place in Germany, Article 3(3) would 
apply. Article 3(3) is designed to limit the parties’ choice from evading French 
mandatory provisions. This scenario assumes that an entirely different national 
(country’s) law has been selected in place of the law where both parties are 
habitually resident. Placing the significant matters of implementation, authenticity 
of the language versions of the CESL and its (expectantly, autonomous) 
interpretation to one side, Having selected German Law as the applicable law, 
placing the significant matters of implementation and the expected equivalence in 
authenticity of language and autonomous interpretation to one side, two questions 
remain. Can the parties go further and select the German version of the CESL and 
if so, would such a choice be overridden in circumstances intended to apply 
applicable under where Article 3(3) applies? The rationale of the CESL proposal is 
to facilitate additional choice within a particular country’s law (once chosen) rather 
than as a system of non-State rules. However, rather than merely stating that the 
Rome I Regulation will be “unaffected by the proposal”135 the interaction with 
Article 3(3) requires to be clarified. If the objective of the proposal is to provide 
(targeted) maximum harmonisation rules across the Member States, it must be 
clarified whether the parties in the example above would be prevented barred from 
selecting the CESL of another country in the first instance because their contract is 
an internal contract. If the parties are in the same Member State it is not clear at 
this stage whether (a) the CESL should apply and (b) can apply as a different 
language version when a foreign law is chosen in circumstances related to Article 
3(3). The ability to select another law under Article 3(3) would therefore be 
restricted to the principal national law of that country. Either the CESL should 
apply to all contracts (internal or cross-border) or the position of internal contracts 
should be clarified in both future drafts of the CESL and when the Rome I 
Regulation comes to be revised. 
The remit of the proposal should also be clarified vis-a-vis its future 
interaction with Article 3(4) of the Rome I Regulation. If the contract is connected 
to more than one Member State, and the law of a non-Member State is selected, the 
contractual choice is subject to the overriding rules of Community law, as 
implemented by the lex fori. Again, in view of its objective as a targeted 
harmonisation measure, clarification is required on whether the CESL is to be 
regarded as a mandatory provision (in view of its objective as a targeted 
harmonisation measure) of Community law or merely as an optional set of 
secondary national rules. Given the objective to implement common rules for 
business to business sales contracts within the Community, the optional nature of 
the CESL puts a greater emphasis on how non-EU businesses determine their 
contractual choice of law preferences. The proposal should consider the extent to 
                                                          
135 COM(2011) 635 final (note 124), at 6. 
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which the combination of Article 3(4) and the operation of mandatory EU laws 
facilitate cross-border trade on an equivalent basis to contracts where the CESL has 
been selected by the parties.  
 
 
C.  Interaction with Article 4: Applicable Law in the Absence of Choice 
As is well known, the Rome I Regulation provides rules to determine the 
applicable law where an express or implied choice has been made or where no 
choice has been made by the parties. Since the CESL is currently proposed as a 
purely optional instrument to be selected within a national system of law selected 
by the parties, it has no bearing on Article 4 of Rome I. However, the objective of 
the proposal is to secure maximum harmonisation. Whilst the number of cross-
border contracts which fail to specify a choice of law are likely to be negligible, the 
he scope of the proposed CESL requires to be clarified for the purposes of 
determining to what extent it may or may not apply in the situation where no 
applicable law has been selected by the parties. Article 4 of Rome I determines the 
applicable law in the absence of choice for a variety of situations. In the case of the 
sale of goods, the applicable law is the law of the characteristic performer’s (i.e. 
the seller’s) habitual residence. If the CESL seeks to equip parties with improved 
choice in determining the basis of their contractual obligations, only applicable on 
the basis of the parties’ express choice, then the applicable law rules in the absence 
of choice would not facilitate the application of a CESL, optional or otherwise. 
Whilst this reiterates the need for the parties to actively select the CESL, it does 
limit its utility where no choice of law has been made. The question arises that if 
the objective of maximum harmonisation is to be sufficiently met, should the 
CESL apply by default in such situations where consumers or micro enterprises 
merit protection in cross-border activities?  
 
 
D.  The CESL and the Rome I Regulation: Business-to-Consumer 
Contracts  
Under Article 6(1)(a) of the Rome I Regulation, the law of the consumer’s habitual 
residence applies in a situation where the business “pursued his commercial or 
professional activities in the country where the consumer has his habitual 
residence.”136 When a business operates within a particular jurisdiction and 
concludes contracts there, it is entirely legitimate (and arguably not a cross border 
case) for the law of the consumer’s habitual residence to apply. Alternatively, 
Article 6(1)(b) also enables the law of the consumer’s habitual residence to apply if 
a business – instead of pursuing commercial activities “in the country”, “by any 
means, directs such activities to that country or to several countries including that 
country.”137 In the context of a cross-border sale, the challenges to a business (of 
whatever size) of such consumer protection requires that business to assess the 
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extent of transaction risk with consumers in different jurisdictions and implement 
litigation risk strategies by ensuring commercial activities were directed or 
“intentionally targeted”138 towards particular jurisdictions whilst, by implication, 
actively avoiding other.139 As a buffer to the imposition of a choice of law rule in 
favour of the consumer’s law, Article 6(2) of Rome I enables parties to a consumer 
contract to agree the law applicable to their contract. This choice is subject to the 
mandatory rules of the consumer’s habitual residence. Therefore, the business can 
impose its preference upon the consumer contract but its choice is still restricted. 
The objective of the CESL proposal is to maximise consumer protection rules, but 
it only does so for cross-border sales. It would not therefore affect contracts falling 
under Article 6(1)(a) but apply instead to cross-border contracts falling under 
Article 6(1)(b). The interaction between Article 6(1)(b), Article 6(2) and the CESL 
should be clarified. As HESSELINK 140 has suggested, the effect of the proposal is to 
diminish more stringent consumer protection measured under national law, it is 
questionable whether the objective of the proposal is firmly ground in enhancing 
consumer protection objectives under Article 114 TFEU or, as is more readily 
identifiable, discretely focussed on meeting the needs of businesses operating in 
the internal market, thereby reducing distortions of competition.  
 
 
E.  What Does the Proposal Say Regarding Validity, Consent and 
Illegality? 
A short answer to this is: not a lot.141 Some brief comments may be made on 
matters affected by the choice of an applicable law. Issues of validity are matters 
for the substantive law concerned, not for “secondary”142 applicable law rules. 
According to the Rome I Regulation, any question of validity or illegality of the 
contract or whether a party seeks to argue that he did not consent to the contract, 
are matters for the putative applicable law (i.e. the law that would apply, if the 
choice is a valid choice of law) by virtue of Article 10. Any such questions there-
fore can only be answered once a choice has been validly ascertained in accor-
dance with either Article 3 (express choice: where the CESL could apply) or 
Article 4 (absence of choice). This means potentially two things for the CESL 
proposal. Either the proposal should refer the matters of validity, illegality of lack 
of consent to the principal national law of the Member State under which the 
Common Sales Law has been selected or it should as a complete set of proposals 
designed to enhance cross-border commercial and consumer sales provide rules on 
the extent to which a contract is held to be formally and essentially valid on the one 
hand and illegal on the other. If the CESL is silent on the matter, the parties would 
                                                          
138 L.E. GILLIES, Electronic Commerce and International Private Law, A Study of 
Electronic Consumer Contracts, Ashgate/ Aldershot 2008. 
139 J.S.T ØREN, International Jurisdiction Over Consumer Contracts in e-Europe, 
(2003) 52 I.C.L.Q. 665. 
140 M. W. HESSELINK (note 125) 
141 COM(2010) 348 final (note 124), at 6. 
142 A. MILLS (note 116), at 19. 
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be required to consult the (principal) national contract law rules on such matters. 
Whether this would amount to unnecessary dépeçage of the contract remains to be 
seen. In any event, if the CESL is to provide a complete optional set of rules, 
which are designed to limit compliance, costs and transaction risks, it should take 
the logical step further and provide specific rules determining the validity and 
illegality of a contract where the CESL has been chosen. The CESL should also 
address specifically the manner of its interpretation in the light of its objectives to 
provide maximum harmonisation. In order to achieve consistency (i) between the 
CESL and the Rome I Regulation (ii) when applied between the Member States 
and, (iii) depending on the instrument to be used, an autonomous interpretation 
should be observed. 
 
 
F.  Underlying Choice of Law Issues to Be Resolved  
Whether the proposed CESL will be purely applicable to cross-border sales or also 
to internal sales the Commission has suggested that it will not impact upon the 
Rome I Regulation to any great extent. However, as this section has sought to 
demonstrate, there are a number of matters that require to be considered in the light 
of the Rome I Regulation. In the case of business to business contracts, its inter-
action with Article 3(1) and (3) requires to be clarified. In the case of business to 
consumer contracts, it provides a set of substantive rules that operate in cross-
border situations but will not apply to internal sales, which may actually lead to the 
two tier system identified by the Law Commission in their report,143 ergo a more 
stringent set of national consumer protection laws operating for internal sales 
contracts (where no choice of law issues arise) and another set of (arguably 
reductionist) targeted, harmonised laws for cross-border sales (where the choice of 
law issues are their most acute for consumers and SMEs and most expensive for 
businesses). Since the consumer cannot currently be deprived of the law of his 
habitual residence in cross-border sales, it remains to be seen whether the CESL 
will equip consumers with any greater protection. By comparison, the benefit of a 




VI.  Closing Remarks 
As Commissioner REDING underscored, we are, unquestionably, at a watershed 
moment for European Private Law: 
"The optional Common European Sales Law will help kick-start the 
Single Market…It will provide firms with an easy and cheap way to 
expand their business to new markets in Europe while giving 
consumers better deals and a high level of protection…Instead of 
setting aside national laws, today the European Commission is taking 
                                                          
143 Above (note 127). 
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an innovative approach based on free choice, subsidiarity and 
competition.”144  
Indeed, given the structure of the proposed optional instrument, it may be the 
harbinger of a European Contract Law. Yet, as the proposed optional instrument 
moves through the legislative process, caution needs to be urged as there are a 
number of issues and challenges for any optional instrument, some of which may 
be incapable of solution solely through legislative intervention. Moreover, the 
debate on the broader, Private International Law implications of the (proposed) 
Common European Sales Law has yet to be fully developed. Nonetheless it is clear 
that the increased choice of law brought about by the emergent framework comes 
at a price and means that traders outside the EU will need to conduct additional 






                                                          
144 Commissioner REDING in Press Release IP/11/1175. 
